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Abstract 
The diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
requires exposure to a traumatic stressor, as defined by  
Criterion A in the DSM criteria for PTSD.  Yet, over the 
course of successive revisions of the diagnostic manual the 
range of qualifying stressors has expanded considerably 
(e.g., witnessing terrorist attacks on television).  
Moreover, stressors that still fall short of qualifying for 
Criterion A can produce apparent PTSD.  Taken together, these 
findings imply that people who do satisfy symptomatic 
criteria for PTSD following exposure to less severe stressors 
carry a heavy burden of risk factors.  To test this 
hypothesis, we examined whether the association between the 
risk factor of lower intelligence and more severe PTSD and 
depression symptoms would be greater among women reporting 
less severe childhood sexual abuse (CSA; n = 15) relative to 
women who reported moderate (n = 54) or high (n = 31) 
severity CSA. The evidence was consistent with this 
hypothesis for subjects in the low and moderate severity 
groups, but less so for those in the high severity group.  
Keywords: PTSD, sexual abuse, risk factors, resilience, 
conceptual bracket creep, Criterion A. 
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Risk Factors and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder:  
Are They Especially Predictive Following Exposure  
to Less Severe Stressors? 
  To receive a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), an individual must first meet Criterion A: exposure 
to a traumatic event.
[1] The assumption is that only events 
that qualify for this definition of trauma possess the 
capacity to produce the symptomatic profile of PTSD.   
  However, since the appearance of PTSD in the third 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III)
[2], 
there has been a considerable expansion in the types of 
events that meet Criterion A.  Because of this conceptual 
bracket creep in the definition of trauma,
[3] events that 
never would have qualified according to DSM-III now qualify 
according to DSM-IV-TR.
[1]  For example, the current edition 
of the diagnostic manual no longer requires that someone be 
physically present at the scene of the trauma to qualify as a 
trauma survivor.
[4]  That is, people who feel helpless when 
learning about threats to the safety of others are victims of 
trauma just as much as those whose lives were in danger.  
Indeed, researchers have reported that 4% of Americans living 
far from the sites of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 developed presumptive PTSD,
[5] apparently by viewing Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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television coverage of the violence.  Being physically 
present at the scenes of the attacks would always have 
qualified as exposure to a catastrophic stressor, but merely 
watching the events unfold on television would not, according 
to the original DSM-III concept of trauma.  
  In parallel with the expansion in the DSM definition of 
trauma, researchers have examined whether stressors that fall 
short of Criterion A may nevertheless result in PTSD.  As 
Dohrenwend
[6] recently observed, at least 12 studies have 
shown that these non-Criterion A stressors are often 
associated with PTSD symptoms or with the full syndrome 
itself.  In some studies, non-Criterion A events were 
associated with greater severity of PTSD symptoms than were 
Criterion A events.  For example, college students whose 
worst life event did not qualify for Criterion A reported 
more PTSD symptoms than did college students whose worst life 
event met Criterion A 
[7, 8].  Similarly, a survey of Dutch 
women randomly sampled from the community revealed that for 
adverse events from the previous 30 years, stressors that 
fell short of Criterion A were associated with higher PTSD 
scores than were stressors that qualified for Criterion A 
[9]. 
A survey of Australians likewise revealed that rates of PTSD 
were higher for non-Criterion A stressors than for Criterion Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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A stressors 
[10].  A study of American women interviewed about 
their worst life events indicated that directly experienced 
non-Criterion A events produced PTSD significantly more often 
than did directly experienced Criterion A events. 
[11] Taken 
together, these studies seemingly impugn the DSM assumption 
that only Criterion A events possess the capacity to produce 
PTSD. 
What should we make of these findings?  One 
interpretation is that symptom self-reports of college 
students or community subjects do not signify “real” PTSD as 
diagnosable via clinical interview.  That is, these subjects 
may misunderstand the meaning of emotional numbing, 
flashbacks, and so forth, confusing normal reactions with 
psychopathology.  Questionnaires can overestimate clinically 
diagnosable PTSD, even among war veterans
[12].   
Another interpretation is that symptoms signify genuine 
PTSD, but that its source originates at least as much in 
subjects’ preexisting vulnerabilities as in the nominal 
stressor itself.  In fact, the majority of people who 
encounter trauma do not develop PTSD,
[13] indicating that 
victims vary in their vulnerability for the disorder.  
Accordingly, to elucidate the etiology of PTSD, clinical 
scientists have endeavored to identify variables that either Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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heighten or diminish risk for PTSD among victims of trauma.
[14]  
For example, studying Vietnam veterans, McNally and Shin
[15] 
found that lower levels of intelligence predicted greater 
PTSD symptom severity, even when they controlled 
statistically for extent of combat exposure and level of 
education.  Prospective longitudinal studies have confirmed 
that pretrauma intelligence predicts PTSD symptoms or 
diagnosis with higher levels of intelligence conferring 
protection against PTSD among Vietnam combat veterans,
[16] 
Israeli combat veterans,
[17] and American children exposed to 
civilian trauma.
[18]    
It makes intuitive sense that someone whose PTSD occurs 
after exposure to a low-severity stressor qualifying for 
Criterion A under bracket creep (e.g., viewing news coverage 
of 9/11) or to a non-Criterion A stressor must carry a heavy 
burden of vulnerability to fall ill.  That is, a background-
foreground inversion may occur whereby the importance of the 
stressor recedes into the causal background as the 
vulnerability factors move into the causal foreground for 
people who meet PTSD criteria after experiencing a low-
magnitude stressor.
[19]  If so, then the strength of 
association between a risk factor and PTSD symptoms should be 
much greater for those who have encountered relatively low-Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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magnitude stressors than for those who have encountered high-
magnitude stressors. 
  Yet, as Breslau
[20] observed, no one has directly tested 
this hypothesis. Indeed, it seems self-evidently true. 
However, some indirect evidence suggests that it may be 
incorrect.  Noting the apparent absence of studies on the 
relative impact of risk factors on PTSD among people exposed 
to stressors of varying severity, Breslau
[20] discussed 
Helzer’s
[21] early study on depression in Vietnam veterans. 
Helzer identified premilitary variables, such as childhood 
antisocial behavior, drug use, and failure to graduate from 
high school that predicted postmilitary depression.  Contrary 
to his expectation, he found that the effect of 
predisposition was greatest in veterans with the most trauma 
exposure.  For example, a premilitary history of drug use 
dramatically increased the risk of depression among wounded 
versus nonwounded veterans.  As Helzer
[21] observed, such 
“findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
antecedents have a lesser predictive effect under conditions 
of extreme stress” (p. 121).  
Interpersonal traumatic events, such as rape, result in 
PTSD far more often than do impersonal traumatic events, such 
as motor vehicle accidents.
[22]  Accordingly, reasoned Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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Breslau,
[20] the effect size for the association between a risk 
factor and PTSD should be greater for impersonal trauma than 
for interpersonal trauma.  Yet contrary to this prediction, 
she observed that the effect sizes for the association 
between risk factors and PTSD was greater for interpersonal 
trauma than for impersonal trauma, specifically, motor 
vehicle accidents.
[23]   
  Inspired by Breslau’s
[20] observations, we directly tested 
the background-foreground inversion hypothesis
[19] by examining 
the association of intelligence to PTSD and depression 
symptoms at varying levels of stressor severity in women who 
report a history of childhood sexual abuse (CSA).  To 
evaluate whether the magnitude of the association between 
intelligence and symptoms of PTSD and depression varied as a 
function of stressor severity, we classified CSA subjects as 
experiencing low, medium, or high CSA severity.  We predicted 
that the strength of association between intelligence and 
symptoms would be stronger in the low severity group than in 
the medium severity group, and weakest in the high severity 
group.  That is, as the magnitude of the stressor declines, 
the effect of the risk factor on PTSD and depression symptoms 
should increase.  
   Method Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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Subjects 
  The subjects were 102 women who had responded to our 
newspaper announcement inviting women to participate in a 
research project concerning risk and resilience variables in 
women who had experienced sexual abuse during childhood. A 
brief interview during the phone screen determined 
eligibility (i.e., that the subject recalled at least one 
episode of sexual abuse involving physical contact comprising 
fondling, oral-genital contact, or sexual intercourse).  
Procedure 
Upon arrival at our laboratory, subjects read and signed 
an informed consent form that described the study. The 
Institutional Review Board of Harvard University approved the 
protocol and consent form. Subjects provided a saliva sample 
for genotyping and participated in two cognitive tasks 
unrelated to the hypotheses tested in this article.  Subjects 
then completed a battery of questionnaires, including 
assessments of post-trauma psychopathology, characteristics 
of the trauma memory, and a questionnaire about their 
recollections of abuse.
[24] 
  We constructed a measure of trauma severity by scoring 
two open-ended questions from the abuse recollections 
questionnaire, one asking about the perpetrator and the other Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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asking about the number of episodes of CSA.  We classified 
our subjects into three categories of trauma severity.  The 
lowest level included those subjects who reported only a 
single incident of CSA by a perpetrator who was not a nuclear 
family member (e.g., a stranger or an older cousin).  The 
medium level of severity included those subjects who 
experienced a single incident by a nuclear family member 
(e.g., a father or an older brother) or experienced more than 
one incident by a perpetrator who was not a nuclear family 
member.  The highest level included those subjects who had 
experienced more than one incident by a perpetrator who was a 
nuclear family member.  Scores on the severity measure ranged 
from two to four.  We predicted that the strength of 
association between intelligence and PTSD symptoms and 
depression symptoms would be greatest for those subjects in 
the lowest level of stressor severity.  
  The low severity group included 15 women, the medium 
severity group included 54 women, and high severity group 
included 31 women. We lacked severity data on two subjects 
(e.g., subject declined to note whether the perpetrator was a 
nuclear family member) whose other data we included for the 
overall analyses testing the correlation between intelligence 
and PTSD and depression symptoms, respectively.   Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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Measures 
  Posttraumatic Checklist, Civilian version (PCL-C).
[25] One 
of the most widely used self-report measures of PTSD,
[26] the 
PCL-C contains 17 items that constitute the symptomatic 
criteria for PTSD.  Subjects rate each item on a five-point 
scale ranging from one (Not at all) to five (Extremely) to 
indicate how seriously the symptom has bothered them during 
the past month. Total scores can range from 17 to 85. 
Subjects rate each item in reference to a “stressful life 
experience” (e.g., childhood sexual abuse).  Following usual 
practice, we summed the scores for each of the 17 items, 
thereby obtaining a dimensional measure of posttraumatic 
symptoms.  We also identified subjects whose total score was 
50 or higher and who met symptomatic criteria for PTSD by 
scoring at least a three (Moderately) on at least one B 
(reexperiencing) symptom, at least three (avoidance and 
numbing) symptoms, and at least two (arousal) symptoms. 
  Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II).
[27] The BDI-II is 
a 21-item questionnaire that measures symptoms of depression.  
Subjects rate each item on a severity scale ranging from 0 to 
3. Total scores range from zero to 63.    
  Shipley Institute for Living Scale.
[28]  The Shipley scale 
has a verbal subtest and a nonverbal reasoning subtest. It Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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measures cognitive ability, and total scores correlate 
strongly with full scale WAIS-R IQ (r = .87).
[29] We converted 
each subject’s score into its estimated WAIS-R equivalent. 
Results 
  Because we had directional predictions, our tests are 
one-tailed unless otherwise noted.  Degrees of freedom vary 
because of missing data for some subjects. 
Preliminary Analyses 
  The means and standard deviations for age, IQ, PTSD 
symptoms, and depression symptoms for the stressor severity 
groups appear in Table 1.  Analyses of variance revealed no 
significant differences among the groups on these variables. 
However, the mean age of the high severity group tended to be 
greater than the mean age of the low severity group.  
  In the low, medium, and high severity groups, 27%, 33%, 
and 62% met criteria for presumptive PTSD, respectively. 
Consistent with the dose-response concept,
[30] as trauma 
severity increased, so did the severity of PTSD symptoms, 
r(92) = .21, p = .02.  However, depression severity did not 
increase significantly as a function of trauma severity, 
r(97) = .13, p = .10. 
  Replicating previous findings, lower intelligence 
predicted more severe PTSD symptoms, r(92) = -.22, p = .02.  Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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Intelligence also predicted depression symptoms, r(99) = -
.19, p = .03. 
  We next examined whether the strength of association 
between lower intelligence and greater PTSD and depression 
symptoms varied as a function of stressor severity.  Among 
low stressor severity subjects (n = 15), intelligence 
predicted both severity of PTSD symptoms, r(13) = -.43, p = 
.05, and depression symptoms, r(13) = -.61, p = .008.  The 
point biserial correlation between intelligence and PTSD 
caseness was large, rpb(13) = -.68, p = .002. 
Among medium stressor severity subjects (n = 54), 
intelligence did not significantly predict severity of PTSD 
symptoms, r(46) = -.15, p = .15, nor severity of depression 
symptoms, r(51) = -.03, p = .81.  The point biserial 
correlation between intelligence and PTSD caseness was 
negligible, rpb(47) = -.001, p = .50.   
To test whether the effect sizes in the low stressor 
severity group were larger than were those in the medium 
stressor severity group, we first converted the correlations 
to Fisher Z scores.  The correlation between intelligence and 
depression symptoms was significantly greater in the low 
stressor severity group than in the medium stressor severity 
group, Z = 2.12, p = .02.  The correlation between Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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intelligence and PTSD symptoms was not significantly greater 
in the low stressor severity group than in the medium 
stressor severity group, Z = .97, p = .17.   However, the 
point biserial correlation between intelligence and PTSD 
caseness was significantly greater in the low stressor 
severity group than in the medium stressor severity group, Z 
= 2.59, p = .005.  Taken together, these data are generally 
consistent with the hypothesis that vulnerability factors 
have stronger association with PTSD (and depression) symptoms 
in victims whose trauma severity is less marked.  
However, the data from our high stressor severity 
subjects (n = 31) were not entirely consistent with this 
hypothesis.  Although the negative association between 
intelligence and PTSD symptoms for these subjects, r(28) = -
.29, p = .06, was numerically smaller than for the low 
stressor severity subjects, it was numerically higher than 
for the medium stressor severity subjects.  A similar pattern 
held for the intelligence-depression association, r(29) = -
.28, p = .06.  For the high severity group, the point 
biserial correlation between intelligence and PTSD caseness 
was nonsignificant, rpb(27) = -.29, p = .07.  However, 
consistent with our hypothesis, this correlation was Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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marginally less than in the low stressor severity group, Z = 
1.51, p = .07 
None of the other differences among effect sizes between 
stressor severity groups was significant (ps > .05, one-
tailed).   
Discussion 
  Conceptual bracket creep in the definition of trauma 
greatly expands the range of stressors that satisfy Criterion 
A1 for PTSD.  Although certain stressors, especially 
interpersonal ones such as rape, are especially likely to 
result in PTSD, merely feeling helpless upon hearing the news 
of another person’s misfortune can certify recipients as 
trauma survivors themselves, enabling them to qualify for the 
diagnosis.  Moreover, several studies show that people often 
report greater PTSD symptom severity following non-Criterion 
A stressors than following Criterion A stressors. 
  For those who develop PTSD following low-magnitude 
stressors, one might expect a background-foreground inversion 
whereby the stressor recedes into the causal background while 
risk factors move into the causal foreground.  This should 
hold for both non-Criterion A events and for Criterion A 
events of relatively low magnitude.  Accordingly, the 
magnitude of the relationship between a risk factor and PTSD Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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symptoms should be greater among people exposed to relatively 
less severe stressors than among people exposed to more 
severe ones. 
  Consistent with this hypothesis, for women exposed to 
presumably less severe CSA, the negative correlation between 
intelligence and both PTSD and depression symptoms was 
numerically greater than for women exposed to CSA of moderate 
severity.  The point-biserial correlational data for 
intelligence and presumptive PTSD-caseness provided the 
strongest support for our hypothesis.  The correlation 
between intelligence and presumptive PTSD caseness was 
strongly negative for subjects in the low severity group, 
essentially zero in the medium severity group, and 
nonsignificantly negative in the high severity group.  
  Our study has limitations.  First, the severity measure 
was less than ideal. Because questions about the perpetrator 
and the frequency of abuse episodes were open-ended, the data 
sometimes lacked precision.  For example, some subjects who 
reported more than one episode of abuse mentioned that it 
occurred many times without specifying a number.  
Accordingly, we grouped subjects who mentioned that it 
occurred twice with those who said it occurred countless 
times.  Moreover, we assumed that one episode of abuse by a Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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nuclear family member was equivalently severe as multiple 
episodes by non-nuclear family member. This assumption is 
subject to debate.  For example, a single violent sexual 
assault by a stranger may be more toxic than two episodes of 
fondling by one’s father.  Indeed, according to our 
classification system, an eleven-year-old girl who 
experienced a brutal rape by a stranger would fall into the 
low stressor category, thereby adding statistical noise to 
our analyses.      
Nevertheless, despite the limitations of this measure of 
stressor severity, we still found a dose-response effect with 
the study group as a whole. This finding provides support for 
our method of classifying stressful CSA experiences, its 
limitations notwithstanding.  Furthermore, our measures of 
cognitive ability and PTSD symptoms were reasonably good 
ones. The Shipley Institute of Living Scale and the PCL-C 
correlate well with the WAIS-R and structured interviews for 
PTSD, respectively.  
Another limitation is the relatively small size of our 
study group, especially those in the low severity subgroup.  
Despite the limited statistical power to detect significant 
effects, we still corroborated the hypothesis in this group.   Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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However, the results require cautious interpretation because 
effects involving small samples are often unstable.  
  A major purpose of our research was to stimulate 
research on the background-foreground inversion hypothesis.  
One might assume that it would be difficult to test the 
hypothesis that people whose PTSD results from exposure to 
low magnitude stressors carry a burden of vulnerability.  
That is, the dose-response principle implies that low 
magnitude stressors will seldom produce PTSD.  Yet studies on 
non-Criterion A events produce presumptive PTSD far more 
often than most experts would have predicted. 
There are several ways to test the background-foreground 
inversion hypothesis.  One can assess it across stressor 
categories (e.g., natural disaster versus rape).  As we noted 
previously, interpersonal traumatic events result in PTSD far 
more often than do impersonal ones.  Accordingly, the 
background-foreground inversion hypothesis would predict that 
an individual who develops PTSD following an impersonal 
traumatic event should carry a greater burden of 
vulnerability than an individual who develops PTSD following 
an interpersonal traumatic event. [cf. 18]   
In addition, one can assess stressor severity within a 
stressor category, as we did in this study.  Within-category Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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variation might include whether one directly experienced the 
event, witnessed it personally, or only learned about it 
later.  Another variable might be extent of injury.  Suffice 
it to say, the prediction would be that the magnitude of 
effect between a risk factor and PTSD would be greater among 
subjects encountering lower magnitude stressors relative to 
subjects encountering higher magnitude stressors.  
Furthermore, the background-foreground inversion hypothesis 
might hold for some stressors or some risk factors, but not 
for others.  Regardless of the outcome, the findings would 
illuminate the etiology of PTSD. 
Finally, one can vary the risk factor involved.  In 
addition to intelligence, researchers might test this 
hypothesis by examining neuroticism, hippocampal volume, 
social support, and other variables that affect the 
likelihood of PTSD following exposure to trauma. 
In conclusion, studies showing that people exposed to 
non-Criterion A events or events that would not have 
qualified as Criterion A stressors prior to the post-DSM-III 
expansion in the concept of trauma run counter to the 
assumption that only catastrophic trauma can produce the 
symptomatic profile of PTSD.  If these people carry an 
especially heavy burden of vulnerability, then this would Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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explain how “subtraumatic” stressors can sometimes produce a 
posttraumatic syndrome. 
   Testing Conceptual Bracket Creep                                                                                   
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations on Age and Questionnaire 
Measures as a Function of Stressor Severity 
                     Severity Group 
Measure     Low           Medium        High    F      p 
Age         36.1          42.4          45.3   3.007  .054 
           (11.7)        (12.2)        (11.2)    
IQ          98.7          93.8          97.6   1.037  .359 
           (13.9)        (13.7)        (16.3) 
PCL-C       39.0          42.3          48.9   2.242  .112 
           (13.8)        (16.1)        (18.4) 
BDI-II      15.3          17.9          20.0   0.852  .430 
            (8.6)        (12.1)        (12.5) 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. IQ = WAIS-R 
estimate from the Shipley Institute for Living Scale. PCL-C = 
Posttraumatic Stress Checklist-Civilian version. BDI-II = 
Beck Depression Inventory, second edition. 
                
 
  
 